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IN THE SUPREME COUR'r OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARILYN MANDARIHO OWEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant Case No. 15330 
-vs-
ROBERT BALLARD OWEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BEIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant from the decision of 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying the Plain-
tiff-Appellant's Order to Show Cause to modify the 1973 Decree 
of Divorce to increase child support payments. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court entered its Order that there is no 
substantial change in circumstances, since the Decree of 
Divorce, established by Plaintiff-Appellant justifying a 
modification of the Divorce Decree as to child support. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this court affirm the judgment of the 
lower court and that Appellant's request for attorney's fees 
on appeal be denied. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Parties to this action were divorced in the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on November 
21, 1973, pursuant to the terms of a stipulation executed 
between the parties on the 15th day of November, 1973, 
(R. p.20). The Decree of Divorce (R. p.25) provided that 
Respondent was to pay the sum of One hundred dollars ($100.00) 
per month per child, child support, for the use and benefit 
of the two minor children of the parties (R. p.26). Further, 
the Respondent was ordered to maintain heal th, life and accident 1 
insurance policies on the children until they were eighteen 
(18) years of age (R. p. 27). The Respondent has fully complied 
with all the terms of the Divorce De~ree (Appellants Brief p.2), I 
Respondent disagrees with Appellant's Brief (Appellants 
I Brief p.3) that certain facts are established by the testimony 
given at the hearing. Respondent submits to the court that 
the following facts are established by the testimony and 
pleadings on file in this action: 
1. Appellant claimed her monthly expenses have increased 
by $432.33 per month (Tr. p.10). There was no evidence 
presented by the Appellant demonstrating which portion of her 
alleged increase in living costs for normal monthly expenses 
were attributable to the care, maintenance and support of the 
minor children, excluding child care which has decreased by 
$90.00 (R. p.35). 
-2-
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2. Appellant's income has increased from $4,200.00 
per year (child support and alimony) in 1973; to $7,800.00 
per year in 1976 (Tr. pp. 23-24) to $11,424.00 per year in 
1977. This figure is arrived at by computing Appellant's 
income at the time the Order to Show Cause was filed, $752.00 
per month, multiplied by 12 months, plus $2,400.00 per year 
child support. At the time the Order to Show Cause was filed 
the Appellant was ne.tting $600. 00 per month plus $200. 00 per 
nonth per child or a net annual income of $9,600.00 per year. 
The Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her merit position with 
the Utah State Auditor's office thirteen (13) days prior to 
the Order to Show Cause hearing (Tr. p.3, Tr. p.17), even 
though her net income had increased 229% since the tine of the 
divorce. 
3. Respondent's gross income increased from $1,162.00 
($13,944.00 per year) in 1973 to $1,584.00 per month 
($19,008.00 annually) in 1977 (Tr. pp. 24, 26). 
4. Respondant's net income increased from $888.69 
at the time of the divorce to $1,121.10 at the time of the 
hearing (Tr. p. 26), a net increase of 26%. 
5. Appellant's equity in the home awarded to her in 
the divorce is, at a minimum, $25,000.00 after deducting the 
contingent claim of $5,000.00 which Respondent has in the 
event Appellant remarries or sells the home (Tr. p.22). 
6. At the time the Appellant suffered the injury 
referred to in her brief she was receiving alimony. At no 
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time did she request an increase of that award (Tr. p.22). 
Appellant represented in her affidavit filed in support of the 
Order to Show Cause that she lost time from work as a result 
of the injury. She later admitted this was false. She was 
not working at that time (Tr. p.20). 
7. At the time of the divorce Appellant's Affidavit 
did not state or acknowledge that she was receiving any support 
or remuneration from her father whatsoever. The Appellant 
further testified that this undisclosed support terminated 
approximately two years before the hearing on this Order to 
Show Cause (Tr. p.7). 
8. Appellant testified she had been unable to purchase 
clothes for her children, yet she purchased $375.00 worth 
of clothes for herself in January of 1977 (Tr. p.18). 
9. Appellant incurred a $7,000.00 loan on January 
i1, 1977 (Tr. p.18) and signed the Affidavit in Support of 
the Order to Show Cause on the 26th day of February, 1977 
(R. p. 36). 
10. The only item of furniture received by the .Respon-
dent at the time of the divorce was the kitchen table (Tr. p.23). 
Appellant received all other furnishings and fixtures. 
ii. The testimony regarding the purported medical 
and dental n.eeds of the children were admitted over counsel 
for the Respondent's objection (Tr. p.13). The need and 
cost were complete hearsay and speculation. 
i2. After the divorce the Respondant could not afford 
-4-
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an apartment of his own (Tr. p.9) and had to live with his 
grandmother for a year to pay off the debts and obligations 
incurred prior to the d~vorce. In October of 1976, Respondent 
purchased a condominium as his principal residence (Tr. p.30). 
He borrowed the down payment from his mother (Tr. p.30), 
and currently has an additional obligation of $6,500.00 to 
the Utah State Credit Union. 
13. Since the time of the divorce Respondent has main-
tained medical insurance coverage for the children at all 
times (Tr. p.17). 
14. Respondent's living expenses have gone up sub-
stantially more than those of the Appellant (R. p.52) including: 
medical insurance for Respondent and his children inlcuding 
current expenses directly related to the children as follows: 
medical insurance for Respondent and his children $21.92 a 
month; savings bonds for the children, $4.00 per month; child 
support, $200.00 per month; children's clothing books etc. 
$12.00 per month; Christmas and birthday gifts. 
15. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found 
no substantial change of circumstances proven by the Appellant 
to justify a modification of the DIDvorce Decree. Respondant 
requested no modification of the Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE APPELLANT'S 
-5-
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CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF RESPONDANT'S 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION. 
At the time of the parties' divorce in November of 1973 
the Appellant claimed monthly expenses in the sum of $668.00 
per month and income in the amount of $56. 00 per month (R. p.12), f 
The Appellant executed a stipulation that a Decree be entered I 
awarding her child support for two children in the smm of 
$200.00 per month and $150.00 alimony for a period of 18 months. 
This settlement was approximately $300.00 less than her stated 
monthly expenses. At the time of the divorce, the home of the 
parties awarded to the Appellant was valued by her at $27 ,000.00 
(R. p.12) which is now worth at least $53,000.00 (Tr. p.22). 
Appellant's equity is at least $25,000.00. 
Appellant's annual income for the year 1977, had she not 
quit her job l3 days prior to the hearing in the court below, 
would have been $ll,424.00 per year including the child support 
payable by the Respondant. Her net income for the year 1977, 
including child support would have been $9,600.00 per year or 
$800.00 per month net. This constitutes a net increase of 229% 
since the time of the divorce. 
In Noverr~er of 1973 the Respondent had a net income of 
$888.69 which increased to $l,121.10 (Tr. p.26); a net increase 
of 26% before deducting child support payments. 
At the hearing before Judge Hanson, neither Appellant nor i 
her counsel established, with any specificity, additional costs 
-6-
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necessary for the health and well being of the children. The 
only specific costs presented by the Appellant were in regards 
to speculative dental work. This testimony was admitted over 
objection of counsel for Respondent (Tr. p.13). Admission of 
this testimony constituted error in that it was speculative and 
hearsay. No work was performed nor arrangements made to perform 
it. It appears that Appellant doesn't know if, in fact, Respon-
dent is unwilling to assume these costs. Appellant had not 
discussed the orthodontic work with him "for awhile" (Tr. p.20). 
Appellant is attempting to modify the Decree because she 
finds working a substantial, merit position distasteful (Tr. p.17). 
Her alimony expired and she feels Respondent should support 
her. Respondent dearly loves his children and willingly supports 
them. He cannot and should not be subject to the Appellant's 
irresponsibility,regarding her finances,to pay her additional 
sums which she artfully claims the children need but are actually 
for her personal use. 
Appellant's brief states that she could not afford insur-
ance (App. brief p.7) but the transcript reflects only that she 
did not have insurance at the time of theiaccident. Appellant 
testified that the burn received by her interfered with her 
employment (Tr. p.9) but it is abundantly clear that her vol-
untary termination of her merit position with the State of Utah, 
five (5) days after the signing of the Affidavit in Support 
of Order to Show Cause, had nothing whatsoever to do with any 
-7-
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I 
I 
prior injury, but was a voluntary decision on her part (Tr, p.11
1
: 
There is no dispute that the Respondent has the duty and obli- \ 
gation to provide support for the use and benefit of his minor I 
children. He has faithfully complied with this Order since the 
1 
Decree. There is al~o no question that the duty of support 
is not the Respondent~ alone, 78-45-4 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 is amended 1957). 
Appellant cites several cases in support of the propos-
ition that inflationary trends are griounds to modify the Decree 
of Divorce. The issue before the court below was not inflation, 
but whether or not Appellant presented sufficient evidence to 
the court to establish a substantial change in circumstances 
requiring additional support. The evidence is clear that the 
real substantial change in circumstances has been Appellent's 
greater income. Respondent makes no attempt in these proceedings, 
to reduce the child support payable, recognizing he has an 
obligation towards his children to assist in their support and 
maintance. 
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor I 
of the witnesses at the hearing and was in a superior position 
to judge the veracity and needs of the respective parties. 
Afipellant relies on the case of Russell v. Russell 551 
p.2d 231 (Utah 1976) to support the proposition that inflation 
or increased age of children, in and of itself, is sufficient to' 
justify increasing support. In the Russell case the husband 
-8-
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did not present any evi<lence as to his financial condition. 
Respondent submitted all available information regarding his 
financial status an<l, while it is conceded that his net income 
has increased 26% since the time of divorce, his basic montlUy 
expenses have also increased. In the Russell case, the decision 
of the Court held that since the ex-husband chose not to pre3 ent 
any testimony regarding his current financial status it should 
be presumed that he is capable of paying $160.00 a month for 
his two minor children whereas, at the time of the divorce, he 
was found able to pay $338.40 support for six children. 
Appellant also contends that the case of Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974), holds that inflation and 
the fact the children are older .ire sufficient grounds to justify 
an increase in support. Appellant badly misconstrues the 
Mitchell case. The Court found that the wife and the children 
were in need of additional sums to support themselves. Because 
the transcript was not submitted and this Court could not review 
the record, the district court decision was presumed valid and: 
The burden is upon Appellant to prove that the evidence 
clearly proponderates against the finding as made; or there 
was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial error; or a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
[Citing Harding v. Harding, 26 U. 2d 277, 48 P. 2d 308 (1971); 
Searle v. Searle; 52-2 P. 2d 697 (Ut. 1974)], (P. 1360). 
The decision of Judge Hanson is clearly supported by the 
record. The evidence preponderates to support Judge Hanson's 
findings and the order entered by Judge Hanson, without 
objection by the Appellant (R. p. 60), is in conformance with 
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the aforementioned decision of this Court. 
POINT II 
THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BAR HER FROM 
OBTAINitlG EQUITABLE RELIEF. 
This action is an attempt to obtain alimony under the 
guise of child support. It is submitted that a review of the 
evidence and pleadings in this action requires the application 
of the principal that "one who seeks equity must do it". Sovey 
v. Sovey 29 U. 2d 294, 508 P. 2d 810 (1973). At the time of 
the divorce, the Appellant submitted in her Affidavit (R. p.12) 
that her monthly minimum expenses were $668.00. She stated 
that she had no other source of income. The Appellant then 
stipulated to the entry of the decree whereby the Respondent 
was to pay her $350.00 per month. At the time of the Order 
to Show Cause hearing in June of 1977, the Appellant suddenly 
materializes a previously undiscolsed source of income, her 
father. She testified he helped her financially (Tr. p.16) 
in an average amount of $250.00 per month up and until July, 
1975, two years before the Order to Show Cause hearing. The 
Appellant filed a false affidavit at the time of the divorce 
and falsly testified at the hearing. She stated that during 
the year 1973 and 1974 she had no income (Tr. p.23). Further, 
she stated that during the year 1975 she made $1,700.00 from 
the real estate contract (Tr. p. 23 & 24). She made no mention 
of the sums attributed to her father, as income to her. 
-10-
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In October of 1976 the Respondent, after several years 
of careful, financial management, including living with his 
grandmother for a year to catch up on the bills from his 
divorce (Tr. p. 29) ,.purchased a condominium. The indebtedness 
assumed by the Respondent at the time of the divorce was 
between $3,000.00 and $4,000.00 (Tr. p.29). In October, 1976 
the Respondent did not have suffic~ent capital to make a dov.m 
payment on this residence. He borrowed $2,600.00 from his 
mother (Tr. p.30) and has reduced that obligation to $2,100.00. 
He has owned this condominium for less than one year. He also 
owes the Utah State Credit Union $6,500.00. 
The Appellant, apparently did not believe the Respondent 
should be able to improve his living conditions. Immediately 
after Respondent purchased the condominium in October of 1976 
the Appellant took steps to set up artificial grounds to sub-
stantiate her claim to modify the decree. On January 17, 1977 
Appellant instituted a loan of Seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) 
(Tr. p.l8). Four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) was expended to 
pay for her medical bills because she failed to carry medical 
insurance. (Tr. p.18). Another portion of the money was spent 
to pay off obligations which the Respondent had co-signed 
in an attempt to assist his ex-wife. Appellant also purchased 
$350.00 to $400.00 worth of new clothes for herself (Tr. p.18), 
and paid some house payments and heating bills. Three weeks 
after the Appellant obtained the loan, she signed the af·fidavi t 
in support of her Order to Show cause (R. p.34). On the second 
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day of June, 1977, 13 days prior to the Order to Show Cause, 
Appellant quit her job (Tr. p.17) where she had worked for more 
than a year as a merit employee for the State of Utah. She ther. 
testified that her gross salary potential was $600.00 per 
month (Tr. p.5) two weeks after she has quit a job in which 
she grossed $752.00 per month. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT FOR 
THE COURT TO MAKE ANY DETERMINATION AS TO THE PURPORTED 
INCREASED NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN. 
The Appellant chose to present evidence a-s to her general 
cost of living (Tr. p. 11 and 16). The evidence was insufficien•\ 
to substantiate any claim that the children are in need of in-
1 
creased support from the Respondent. Aside from the hypothetical 
medical and dental expenses the Appellant failed to attribute 
any of her purported expenses to the children with any specifici'., 
I 
Respondent does not contend that child support payments must 
be computed from specifically, proportioned needs of the childrer j 
as compared to the family unit as a whole. Appellant must estab-1 
I 
lish by competent testimony that there is, l.) a real and 
actual need by the children for additional support and 2.) 
~he nature and extent of that need. The Appellant failed to 
establish either condition. 
The fact that the Appellant claims her car is run down 
(Tr. p.14); she doesn't bother to do her yard work (Tr. p.14); 
there are four windows which do not have drapes and did not have 
-12-
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at the time of the divorce (Tr. p.14); gasoline costs have 
increased (Tr. p.11) and she requires more expensive clothing 
(Tr. p.11) are not relevant to the issues before Court. The 
purported medical and dental needs of the children, admitted 
over counsels' objection, are single expenditures. It is 
interesting to know that Appellant did not request the court 
order that the Respondent assist her in these expenses. Rather, 
Appellant attempted to utilize this evidence to support an 
increase in Respondent~ continuing support duty rather than 
have the Respondent aid her in these extraordinary expenses if 
and when they are ever incurred. There was never any evidence 
submitted to the increased costs to support the children them-
selves. Without more specific costs of the increased needs of 
the children any decision which the court would have made woul~ 
have been purely speculative and a clear abuse of discretion. 
The court was unable to determine that the children, and not 
the Appellant, needed additional funds. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLED TO PAY THE APPELLANT'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Appellant has set forth in her brief (Appellant's brief 
page 12) that the Respondent: " ***has refused to adequately 
assist in supporting such children". This allegation is absolutely 
false. The Respondent has timely and fully complied \-ti th the 
Divorce Decree. He dearly loves his children and willingly 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contributes to their support and maintenance. It is unjust 
that the Respondent be ordered to support the Appellant's 
calculated and artificial attempt to obtain alimony under the 
guise· of child support. The Appellant was denied attorney's 
fees in the court below and should be denied such fees on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests the decision of the lower court be 
affirmed. The substantial change in circumstances was not 
established by the Appellant. Appellant's income has risen 
substantially more than that of the Respondent. She has man-
ipulated her income and needs to present a destitute picture. 
Upon examination, this picture reveals a woman with excellent 
employment but with grandiose expectations. The Appellant 
quits her job and requests additional child support. The issue 
is not child support. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate 
any increased needs of the children with reasonable certainty. 
She simply decided that she did not like working and looked to 
the Respondent to pick up the slack. The Respondent has worked 
for the last several years to re-establish his own security. 
He has done this in conjunction with his obligation to assist 
his children not in spite of that responsibility. 
The only substantial change of circumstances that has 
occured since the divorce is that the Appellant's net income 
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has increased 229% since the time of the divorce. Respondent's 
income has increased 26% since the time of the divorce but 
that increase has been totally absorbed by his increased 
housing needs. Respondent should not have to bow to the whims 
and caprices of the Appellant which she establishes for her 
own benefit, not those of the children. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert Felton 
Attorney for Defendant 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERI'IFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Brief of.Respondent by delivering 
two copies thereof, personally, to Joseph L. Henriod or Bruce 
J, Nelson, Attorney for Appellant at 410 Newhouse Building, 
D-ec 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll, this 15f- day of November, 1977. 
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